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After forty years, Chile recently expressed the will to no longer being governed by
the Constitution bequeathed by Pinochet. And it did so in a resounding manner
through a plebiscite. The path that will lead to the election of the Constitutional
Convention and then the drafting of the new Constitution seems to be exciting:
we are observing how a genuine constituent moment is unfolding. However, the
importance of the social question coupled with the new constitution carries the risk
of over-constitutionalisation and the lack of leadership in the constitutional process
could diminish its perception of legitimacy.
An extraordinary vote
Chile overwhelmingly voted in favour of writing a new constitution. Final results
show that 78.27% of people voted to approve a process that will bring forth a new
constitution. The indication is clear and cannot be misinterpreted. There has to be a
clear symbolic break with the written Constitution of the dictatorship. However, there
is more to that than the obviously important symbolic constitutionalisation of a new
order. The distribution of the votes is also quite telling. In 341 of the country’s 346
communes the option ‘approve’ (apruebo) won. In the 20 communes with the highest
support, the vote for approval exceeded 88%. The other option, rejection, succeeded
only in five of the 346 communes. It is noteworthy that three of them are also the
wealthiest communes in the country (i.e., those with higher income) while the other
two are small and isolated communities (one, literally, in the Antarctic). With these
results, the idea of division or polarisation in Chile comes into question and shows a
different cleavage. This time the great divide is between the economic and political
elite on one hand, and the people on the other. Ample sectors of the Chilean society
felt that they hadn’t received their share of the growth and economic prosperity that
the country has experienced over the last decades.
The referendum also showed strong support for one of the options regarding the
way in which the process of constitutional change must be done. The outcome
concerning the question about the constitutional body that will draft the new
Constitution has been equally impressive: 78,99% voted for an entirely newly
elected body with perfect gender equality, while only 21,01% chose the option which
included elected representatives and actual members of the parliament. One should
not underestimate the choice of this option. It shows a high level of distrust and
perceived unrepresentativity of the current elected politicians. If the latter had been
seen as important representative staples of Chilean society, the difference between
the two options would have been substantially lower. Although not all details of the
functioning of the convention have been decided, a 155 seats convention open
equally to both genders might offer the opportunity for the emergence of a new
political subject or the rise of new political figures. Unfortunately, the representation
of indigenous peoples, through specific quotas, is still a matter of debate.
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 Although the participation rates were less impressive than the approval figures –
with 50.90% the turnout barely exceeded that of the last presidential election in 2017
(49,02%) – they must be put into context. First of all, the vote has taken place in
the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic. The impact of the coronavirus on the nation
has been huge (Chile is 8th in deaths/1M pop, with over half-million cases), in many
ways. Even though the figures are more encouraging today, holding the referendum
was an uneasy task. The vote, originally planned for April, was postponed, public
campaigning was severely limited to prevent the spread of the virus. Specific
measures to incentivise safe participation were imposed for the election day: infected
people were excluded from the process, the polling journey was especially long and
a ‘special voting time’ was dedicated to the elderly. Furthermore, it was the highest
participation rate since the vote was made voluntary in 2012. More importantly,
political participation grew in almost all districts. These figures include some
significant increase in the participation rates in the poorest districts and younger
voters, two groups whose political participation had been decreasing during the last
decades.
A constitution for social equality
This substantial rejection of the current Constitution is not only connected to its
origin, as noted recently, but above all to its content. It is quite telling that the form
of political institutions is not at the forefront of the constitutional debate. Given
its origin, one could have expected that presidentialism would be at the centre of
people’s concerns: the repudiation of the old constitutional order would entail the
symbolic rejection of the presidentialist form of government. Yet, quite surprisingly
for a country who experienced a bloody coup organised by the military, the form of
government is not a matter of urgent debate.
As we have already explained in a previous post, the Chilean Constitution has
functioned as a limit to the redistribution of political and economic power. Through
a series of ‘locks’, the Chilean Constitution has safeguarded political and economic
stability at the cost of making the unequal distribution of the benefits of economic
growth constitutionally invisible. For that reason, it became the main target of the
social movement of October 2019. Chile’s awakening (in Spanish, Chile despertó)
was triggered by the frustration of masses due to the structural inequalities and
unfair distribution of welfare across society. The claims of the movement were all
revolving around welfare. From abroad, Chile had been perceived as ‘the miracle’
of the Latin American region. At the same time, many in Chile were burdened by
deep inequalities in education, a high cost of living, poor welfare coverage and poor
pensions, long working hours, industrial predation of the environment, and a massive
sense of abuse (corporate collusion and tax evasion). The protests that erupted
last year brought the social question back on the table. Political parties, rather than
being involved in the organisation of these protests, were actually taken by surprise.
Bypassing directly the link with potentially supportive parties (what Bruce Ackerman
calls the ‘movement-party nexus’), protesters demanded not only the re-embedding
of markets into society, but crucially the constitutionalisation of the social question.
We are observing a reversal of the classic Arendtian trope: while for the author of On
Revolution constitutions should establish the institutions of political freedom without
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getting involved into questions of social justice and poverty, the Chilean movement
coupled almost from the beginning the demand for the redress of social injustice with
the claim for a new constitution.
Content and leadership
Possibly, this is where the most significant challenge lies for the future constitutional
convention. The new Constitution will be called upon to respond to the social
disaster and to support the distribution of welfare and wealth. Expectations, then,
are extremely high and disappointment and failure likely. With multiple demands,
defining the ‘non-negotiable’ seems a defiant task. As we are only at the beginning
of a long process, it is too early to anticipate all the challenges that the main social
and political forces will have to face. Two issues that might affect the next steps
of the constituent process can be mentioned. First, the amount of functions that
will be attributed to the Constitution. As said, there will be intense pressure for
the constitutionalisation of many issues, with all the known problems that the
phenomenon of over-constitutionalisation brings with it: the problematic role of
constitutional justice, the over-entrenchment of norms, and a strong tendency
to originalism. All these phenomena would be incompatible with the spirit of the
protests of October 2019, which showed the creativity of non-institutional politics.
Over-constitutionalisation usually creates the opposite: not an opening of the
space for political action, but a closure. Moreover, an excessive demand put on
the constitutional text might also push the members of the convention to discuss
too many topics, losing the focus on the most foundational issues in favour of
constitutional details and regulation.
The second point of concern is the fact that the social movement, spontaneous at
its origin, has not yet produced a clear political subject (or an alliance of political
subjects) that can be seen as the bearer of the constituent process. It increases the
risk that the process will be captured by the elites and traditional political parties,
losing representativeness and legitimacy in the eyes of the social base that initiated
it. In other terms, no political bloc has become hegemonic yet and, accordingly, no
political subject seems capable, at least at this stage, to function as the catalyst
of constitution-making. Without a subject capable of aggregating and organising
a convergence among forces, it will be difficult to find consistent majorities for the
approval of the new constitutional text. This is even more problematic in light of
the requirement that the new Constitution must be approved by 2/3rd of the whole
convention. The requirement for a super-majority quorum, which was agreed in the
foundational agreement that made the constituent process possible, establishes an
additional difficulty for the constitution-making process.
We have been keen on stressing two features of the Chilean constituent process,
the cleavage between elite and people and the lack of trust in the political system.
At first sight, this looks like a classic populist case: hatred for the elite and loathe
of political parties. Usually, the resentment feeding that hate paves the way for
an authoritarian constitutional outcome. Yet, the Chilean case seems to proceed
on a different trajectory. The referendum’s outcome reveals a certain hope in the
constitution-making process as a new space where to find answers to the social
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question. The end-result of the constituent process is totally uncertain and at this
stage anything is still possible. Even failure should not be discarded as a concrete
possibility. Be that as it may, the social movement and the plebiscite have opened
up a constitutional space previously unavailable. It is now up to political subjects and
movements to make the most out of this precious and rare opportunity.
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